As documented in this article
(2) complicity with respect to international crime where an individual was aware that his or her conduct can or will facilitate conduct of a direct perpetrator; and (3) dereliction of duty with respect to those who exercised de facto or dejure authority as a leader and refused or failed to take reasonable corrective action. 2 Prosecution of several lawyers within the Bush Administration for complicity would be on firm ground, especially with respect to those who wrote memoranda that facilitated the common, unifying plan devised by an inner circle to use torture and other forms of coercive interrogation. As noted above, criminal complicity can occur when a person is aware that his or her conduct (e.g., writing a memo stating that waterboarding is not torture) can or will assist or facilitate conduct of a direct perpetrator. The person who aids and abets need not know that the conduct of the direct perpetrator is criminal or, for example, whether the conduct constitutes "torture" or cruel or inhuman treatment. It suffices that an accused was aware of the relevant factual circumstances, and even a direct perpetrator need not have known that his or her act amounted to an inhuman act either in the legal or moral sense. Furthermore, all acts of assistance, either by words or acts and omissions, that lend encouragement or support will suffice if the accused knows or is aware that such conduct can or will facilitate the use of an illegal tactic or form of treatment.
Are such former officials who are reasonably accused also subject to civil liability for violations of treaty-based and customary international law? The short answer is yes.
II. THE DUTY TO PROVIDE AND THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION
A vast array of international laws assures the right to fair compensation for secret detention and coercive interrogation. For the victims of torture, a mandatory duty to provide fair compensation, including means for rehabilitation, is set forth in Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In 
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the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation.
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Other treaty-based and customary duties of states exist regarding rights of individuals to an effective remedy, access to courts, and nonimmunity with respect to torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Prominent among these are the right to a remedy, access to courts, and nonimmunity that are based in Articles 2(3)(a) and 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 4 as emphasized in the General Com-
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 14(1), openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1984 , 108 Stat. 382, 1465 . Both sentences quoted contain a duty that is phrased in mandatory "shall" language that provides textual clarity regarding the immediate mandatory duty and that is typically self-executing. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 72, 90 n.98, 129-30 n. 14 (2003) [hereinafter PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW] .
If there is even a need for statutory incorporation in view of such clear, immediate, and mandatory language, federal statutes also execute the treaty-based right to a remedy. See infra notes 9, 69-71. Article 14 of the CAT necessarily applies to acts of public officials covered under Article 1 of the treaty and, therefore, Articles 1 and 14 necessarily assure nonimmunity of public officials. See Comm. Against Torture,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture to the United States, 14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006) , available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/e2d4f5b2dccc0a4ccl2571 ee00290ce/$FILE/G0643225.pdf (stating that the U.S. "should recognize and ensure that the Convention applies at all times, whether in peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory under its jurisdiction .... ). See also id 15 ("provisions of the Convention... apply to, and are fully enjoyed, by all persons under the effective control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the world."); id 19 (there exists an "absolute prohibition of torture ... without any possible derogation."); id. 28 ("The State party should ensure, in accordance with the Convention, that mechanisms to obtain full redress, compensation and rehabilitation are accessible to all victims of acts of torture or abuse, including sexual violence, perpetrated by its officials."); id. 32 ("The State party should ensure that all allegations of violence in detention centres are investigated promptly and independently, perpetrators are prosecuted and appropriately sentenced and victims can seek redress, including appropriate compensation."). 4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3)(a), Dec. 9, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR] (stating that each State Party has a duty to "ensure that any person whose rights... are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."); id art. 14(1) ("All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of... his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."). Both provisions are set forth with mandatory "shall" language that provides an immediate duty and is typically self-executing. An attempted declaration of partial non-self-execution with respect to Articles 1-27 of the ICCPR is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and void ab initio as a matter of law. See, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 362-66; infra note 5. In any event, the declaration expressly does not reach Article 50 of the treaty, which mandates application of all of the provisions of the treaty within the U.S. See, e.g., infra note 6. Moreover, federal statutes execute the Covenant for civil sanction [Vol. 42:359 ments of the Human Rights Committee that operates under the auspices of the ICCPR. 5 Article 50 of the ICCPR further mandates that all of " [t] he provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions.", 6 This provision assures that rights and duties under the treaty apply with respect to decisions and conduct in Washington, D.C. as well as in judicial proceedings within the U.S. in which claims to fair compensation proceed.
The rights to an effective remedy and access to courts are also reflected in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 7 which purposes. See infra notes 69-71. Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR expressly applies to acts of public officials and, therefore, necessarily recognizes nonimmunity of public officials. See infra note 48. State could not make a reservation to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, indicating that it intends to provide no remedies for human rights violations. Guarantees such as these are an integral part of the structure of the Covenant and underpin its efficacy."); id at 12, 17 (stating that "when there is an absence of provisions to ensure that Covenant rights may be sued on in domestic courts .. .all the essential elements of the Covenant guarantees have been removed[]" and that an attempted reservation to that effect is void ab initio as a matter of law because it would be "incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.").
6
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 50. Article 50 is set forth with mandatory "shall" language that provides an immediate duty and is typically self-executing. Moreover, it expressly requires that all provisions of the Covenant shall apply in all parts of a federated state without exception. The United States had no reservation with respect to Article 50 and it clearly operates directly within the United States. See PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 362. Moreover, if there is even a need for statutory incorporation of such clear, immediate and mandatory language, federal statutes also execute treaty-based rights to a remedy. See infra notes 69-71.
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights art.8, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law"). On the nature of the Universal Declaration (1) as customary international law, and (2) as an authoritative aid for interpretation of human rights protected by and through the U.N. Charter, see, e.g., MYRES S. MCDOuGAL, HAROLD D.
LASSWELL, LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 272-74, 302, 325-mirrors patterns of generally shared expectations concerning customary roots of the right to an effective remedy in domestic courts for violations of human rights and various other rights under international law. 8 As part of human rights law, rights to an effective remedy and access to courts are also necessarily part of U.N. Charter-based obligations of all members of the U.N. to assure "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights .. .
Undoubtedly for this and related reasons, the U.N. General Assembly emphasized in 2007 and 2008 that "national legal systems must ensure that victims of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and 30 (1980) ; PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 181, 191, 198-200, 228 n.182, 246 n.372, 256 n.468, 286 n.595, 436-37 n.48; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980 ) (quoted infra note 9); Rodriguez Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 796-97 (D. Kan. 1980 Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123-24, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970) . ("Every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate action universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter."); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1980 ) (observing with respect to Articles 55(c) and 56 of the Charter that:
The guarantees include, at a bare minimum, the right to be free from torture. This prohibition has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 (I1) (A) (Dec. 10, 1948) which states in the plainest of terms, 'no one shall be subjected to torture.' The General Assembly has declared that the Charter precepts embodied in this Universal Declaration 'constitute basic principles of international law.' G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) 209-11 (1958) (providing the responsibilities of states and individuals); infra note 24. Certain rights in the Geneva Conventions are not only self-executing (see, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at [71] [72] Paust, Judicial Power, ), but they are also executed for civil sanction purposes by a number of federal statutes. See, e.g., infra notes 69-72. Concerning the fact that the U.S. military was involved in an international armed conflict in Afghanistan, see, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW supra note 1, at 1-3, 7, 10, 47. 19 See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) With respect to the customary andjus cogens crime against humanity and violation of the laws of war known as forced disappearance or secret detention, 27 which was also engaged in as part of an admitted Bush program, 28 it is significant that the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearance 29 affirms expectations of the international community that each state party "shall ensure in its legal system that the victims of enforced disappearance have the right to obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation" and that reparation "covers material and moral damages and, where appropriate, other forms of reparation such as: (a) Feb.12, 1993 It is a principle of International Law that any breach of an international obligation resulting in harm gives rise to the duty to adequately redress such harm .... The obligation to compensate is governed by International Law and it may be neither modified nor disregarded by the State in reliance upon its domestic law. The reparation of the damage flowing from a breach of an international obligation calls for, if practicable, full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which consists in restoring a previously-existing situation. If not feasible, the international court will then be required to define a set of measures such that, in addition to ensuring the enjoyment of the rights that were violated, the consequences of those breaches may be remedied and compensation provided for the damage thereby caused. In addition, there is also the State's obligation to adopt affirmative measures to guarantee that no injurious occurrences such as those analyzed in the case at hand will take place in the future.
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Although the U.S.
has not yet ratified the American Convention, within the U.S., at Guantdnamo, and elsewhere in the Americas, the U.S. is bound to take no action inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention. Such actions would necessarily include orders, authorizations, complicity, and other acts in violation of the human rights to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and the right to "fair compensation" that are protected in the Convention. This obligation arises because the U.S. signed the treaty in 1977 while awaiting ratification.36 Additionally, the U.S. is bound by the American Declaration of the Rights and 34 Garrido and Baigorria Case (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C./No. 39, 9 40 (Aug. 27, 1998) ; see also id. 9 41, 47-65, 73 ("The case law of this Court has consistently been that the State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment, and to ensure the victim adequate compensation."); id. 74 (there is a "legal obligation to investigate ... and to bring to trial and punish the authors, accomplices, accessories after the fact, and all those who may have played some role in the events that transpired."). 35 Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C. /No.162, 9 199-201 (Nov. 29, 2006) . The Court added: "Reparations are measures aimed at removing the effects of the violations. Their nature and amount are dependent upon the specifics of the violation and the damage inflicted at both the pecuniary and non pecuniary levels. These measures may neither enrich nor impoverish the victim or the victim's beneficiaries, and they must bear proportion to the breaches declared as such in the Judgment. " Id. 202 (footnote omitted Reparations-including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of enforced disappearance, 4 1 other crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes-can also be ordered "directly against a convicted person" by the International Criminal Court (ICC). 42 Although the U.S. has yet to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC, it is possible that a U.S. national will be prosecuted before the ICC under certain circumstances. For example, when a crime is authorized, ordered, or abetted and is perpetrated in territory of a party to the treaty (e.g., in Afghanistan), then the ICC could provide civil sanctions against a convicted U.S. national. 26-34 (Nov. 8, 2001 ) (lack of head of state immunity for alleged international crimes is "a rule of customary international law"); Prosecutor v. Furundlija, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 153-55 (Dec. 10, 1998) (the prohibition of torture is "a peremptory norm of jus cogens" and as such "it serves to internationally de-legitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorizing torture" and "would not be accorded international legal recognition"); Barrios Altos v. Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. C./No. 75, Merits Judgment, 41 (Mar. 14, 2001) (amnesty laws "and establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance .... [i] nternational law operates as a restriction and limitation on the sovereignty of nations"; that Hitlerian directives might have had the force of domestic law; to recognize such directives as a defense to international crime "would be to recognize an absurdity" that international law "must be superior to and, where it conflicts with, takes precedence over national law or directives issued by any governmental authority" and that a "directive to violate international criminal common law is therefore void and can afford no protection.. . ."50 The Second Circuit expanded upon these recognitions in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala with respect to torture when recognizing that "the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him--hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting) ( "a state is never entitled to immunity for any act that contravenes ajus cogens norm, regardless of where or against whom that act was perpetrated ... the state cannot be performing a sovereign act entitled to immunity" and "Germany could not have helped but realize that it might one day be held accountable for its heinous actions by any other state, including the United States"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1984 vant international law. Since violations of international criminal law are ultra vires and beyond the lawful authority of any government, and no government can lawfully delegate authority to commit international crimes, 56 the 1988 Act should be interpreted to recognize that a federal employee who commits an international crime is not "acting within the scope of his official duties. ' 57 supra note 1, at 5, 32, 145 n.47, 189 n.5 1), it would seem that a war crime is a "violation of a federal statute" within the meaning of § 2679(b)(2). The same point would pertain with respect to torture in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 2340-2340A. 'd, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) An additional reason why treaty law must be used has been noted in another writing:
1994)), aff
[Since] the 1988 Act and the FTCA are prior in time to ratification of the two treaties mentioned above [i.e., the ICCPR and the CAT] that [require personal liability and] deny any form of immunity [u] nder the last in time rule the treaties must prevail; and they would prevail even if the legislation was enacted subsequent to ratification of the treaties under the "rights under a treaty" exception to the last in time rule.
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Therefore, even if substitution might be possible under an improper interpretation of the 1988 Act (i.e., one that did not follow the Supreme Court's mandate in The Charming Betsy and that did not use relevant international law for proper interpretation of the phrase "acting within the scope of ... official duties"), under the last in time rule, treaty law of the U.S. affirming the need for personal liability must necessarily trump the inconsistent prior legislation, and substitution of the U.S. for individual defendants under the prior legislation should not occur.
An added concern can arise if government lawyers are used to defend those reasonably accused of international crime since "it would be professionally unethical for lawyers who are responsible for prosecution of war crimes on behalf of the United States ... to defend former members of the government who are so reasonably accused .... The clash of interests at stake could not be more sharply delineated., 59 The same concern can arise when a U.S. attorney must represent a foreign state requesting extradition during an extradition hearing in a federal court. States, 995 F.2d 1122 , 1127 (1st Cir. 1993 .. upon determining that there was sexual contact, a district court could find that the employee acted outside the scope of his duties." 549 U.S. at 251, n. 15. If sexual assault is "outside the scope," it must also be apparent that torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment violative of international law are also "outside the scope." Therefore, further to its duty to investigate and, if appropriate, punish the guilty parties, the State is required to remove all obstacles-both factual and legalcontributing to impunity, and use all available means to expedite the investigation and the relevant proceedings, thus preventing the recurrence of acts as serious as those under analysis in the case at hand. The State may not rely upon any domestic law or regulation to justify its failure to comply with the Court's order to investigate and, if appropriate, criminally punish the parties responsible for the La Cantuta events. Particularly, as has been the case ever since the Court's judgment in the case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, the State may never apply amnesty laws-which will produce no effects in the future... raise the statute of limitations, non-ex post facto nature of criminal laws or res judicata defenses, or rely upon the principle of double jeopardy.., or resort to any other similar measure designed to eliminate responsibility in order to escape its duty to investigate and punish those responsible. Accordingly, as the case may be, the relevant investigations need to be opened against all parties investigated, convicted, or acquitted or whose cases were dismissed, in a military criminal proceeding.
Id. 226.
[Vol. 42:359 atonement, 61 sensitize elites to more adequately condition their future behavior, or best serve the rule of law.62 Substitution usually results in dismissal because immunity of the U.S. pertains. 63 Substitution is, therefore, a mendacious form of judicial process that can ultimately deny justice.64 Given this common result, when substitution and dismissal occur, the U.S. is not in compliance with treaty-based and customary international law that requires equal access to courts and the availability of judicial remedies for violations of international law. Substitution and dismissal would especially violate Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR, which expressly mandates that victims "shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity., Supp. 330, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1994 ) ("punitive damages must reflect the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct, the central role he played in the abuses, and the international condemnation with which these abuses are viewed."), quoted in Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 , 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2008 ; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. at 864 ("the objective of the international law making torture punishable as a crime can only be vindicated by imposing punitive damages"), id at 865 (remedy of punitive damages should pertain "in order to give effect to the manifest objectives of the international prohibition against torture"); supra note 60. 62 See Elaine Scarry, Presidential Crimes. Moving on is Not an Option, BOSTON REv. (Sept.-Oct. 2008 ), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR33.5/scany.php ("The incalculable damage left by Bush and Cheney's day-in-and-day-out contempt for national and international law includes the power to ... trivialize into a matter of personal preference any future president's adherence to the law. Will we become a country in which the rule of law is just another policy preference?"). (1987); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 225, 287-88 n.481 ("One can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the courts .... The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the universally "recognized" fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the principle of international law which forbids the denial of justice.") (quoting Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), I 34-35 (1975) ).
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ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2(3)(a). Of course, if the acts are ultra vires they cannot be acting in an official capacity, but the requirement that there be an effective remedy nonetheless pertains.
IV. IMMUNITY DOES NOT PERTAIN BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT
It is of further interest that the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA) 66 will not provide immunity from suits for violations of treaty law of the U.S. or customary international law. Section 5 of the MCA had attempted to deny use by any person of "the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any . . . civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories. 67 With respect to future litigation, the language did not attempt to deny use of (1) customary international law reflected in Geneva law; (2) the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV and customary laws of war reflected therein; (3) any other customary laws of war; (4) related treaty-based or customary human rights law; (5) Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture; (6) any other federal statute as a "source of rights"; or (7) use of the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution for incorporation of human rights of U.S. nationals, 6 8 which in any event must trump an inconsistent statute. Therefore, despite the attempt in Section 5 of the MCA to deny use of the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights, lawsuits are possible, for example, under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA or ATS) with respect to other violations of international law; 69 the Torture Victim Protection Act with respect to torture or extrajudicial killing as defined therein; 70 and-in the case of alleged U.S. victims of terrorist 66 Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 , 2631 -32 (2006 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 67 
Id. § 5(a).
68 Concerning human rights of U.S. nationals under the Ninth Amendment, see, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 323-26, 331-32, 336-40. 69 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) [hereinafter ATCA]. By express terms, this statute is only available for alien plaintiffs but expressly applies with respect to any treaty of the U.S. and the customary law of nations. The ATCA executes both forms of international law.
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TVPA, supra note 9. This statute provides a cause of action for alien and U.S. plaintiffs for torture and extrajudicial killing provided that the defendant acts "under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation." Id. § 2(a). It is possible for a U.S. national to do so. Section 3(b)(2) of the TVPA has a far more limiting definition of torture involving mental pain or suffering than the CAT. See CAT, supra note 3. Since the CAT was ratified on October 21, 1994, after the TVPA had been created, the treaty is last in time and must prevail as domestic law of the United States. Concerning the last in time rule, see, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 100-01, 120. When the United States ratified the CAT, a unilateral understanding in the instrument of ratification considered that mental suffering must be "prolonged" and result from one of four listed causes, but the understanding was incorrect and is not legally relevant. See Paust, Torture, supra note 1, at 1570 n. 107. [Vol. 42:359 tactics and their estates, survivors, or heirs-the Antiterrorism Act (ATS). 7 1 More generally, lawsuits for war crimes and crimes against humanity might also be possible under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.72 Additionally, lawsuits are possible under state law, especially since rights of access to courts and to remedies under treaty-based and customary international law are the supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 73 In fact, a number of state court decisions have addressed war crime and human rights liability. 74 71 18 U.S. C. § 2333 (2006) . This statute provides a cause of action for U.S. plaintiffs and their estates, survivors, or heirs for "terrorism" (as broadly defined in § 2331) and allows treble damages, attorney fees, and costs. An exception exists with respect to a present (not former) "officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting within his or her official capacity or under color of legal authority." Id. § 2337(1). The section, like any federal statute, must be interpreted consistently with international law (see supra note 52) by recognizing that when one is engaged in international criminal conduct, one is not "acting within... official" capacity or under "legal" authority. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, 1993 WL 814304 (N.D. Ga. 1993 ), aff'd, 72 F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 1996 (but focusing on the ATCA re: subject matter jurisdiction, id. at 846-48); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. at 178 (regarding use of § 1331 in the alternative with the TVPA); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 , 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987 ; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 887 n.22 ("We recognize that our reasoning might also sustain jurisdiction under the general federal question jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We prefer, however, to rest our decision upon the Alien Tort Statute, in light of that provision's close coincidence with the jurisdictional facts presented in this case."). This point was addressed but not decided in Kadic v. Karadi, 70 F.3d at 246 (the "causes of action [in this case] are statutorily authorized, and.., we need not rule definitely on whether any causes of action not specifically authorized by statute may be implied by international law.., as incorporated into United States law and grounded on section 1331 jurisdiction."), the court agreeing nonetheless that a more specific statute, the ATCA, provides subject matter jurisdiction and that "jurisdiction" can rest on § 1331 or the ATCA. 301, 315-16, 318-20, 327 (2008 There must be a remedy, and of that remedy the State judiciary has jurisdiction. There is nothing in the Federal Constitution which deprives a State court of power to decide a question of international law incidentally involved in a case over which it has jurisdiction; and for every wrong the common law ... provides an adequate remedy. To sustain this action, therefore, it is not necessary to invoke any statutory
In any event, it is clear that Congress has no power to obviate the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 75 or to violate the separation of powers by substantially interfering with judicial power and attempting to control rules for decision. The latter purpose and effect is exactly what Section 5 of the MCA attempted with respect to judicial use of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and, therefore, it should be recognized that the attempt is inoperative as a violation of the separation of powers.
76 Even if Section 5 could be operative, the attempt in Section 5 to deny claims under the Geneva Conventions "as a source of rights" in cases before the courts would necessarily be trumped either by the venerable "rights under" treaties exception 77 or by the law of war exception 78 to the last in time rule, since rights aid .... Wherefore, on international and common law principles, we adjudge that the petition in this case sets forth a good cause of action ....
Id.
75 See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (the "appellate powers of this court" are not created by statute but are "given by the constitution"), quoted in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575 (2006 Congress has no power to violate the separation of powers by such a blatant denial of a constitutionally mandated, traditional, and essential judicial power to implement treaty law of the United States that, as the Constitution expressly requires, "shall extend to all cases ... arising under... treaties."
The violation of the separation of powers in this instance is especially evident where federal courts have continuing jurisdiction in all cases arising under treaties and Congress attempts to substantially inhibit judicial independence by controlling the results in certain cases. Congress is attempting precisely that by prescribing rules for decision in a particular way or, in this instance, rights and rules of law contained in the Geneva Conventions that cannot be used for decision. This congressional effort to deny use of particular law and to control judicial decision of cases in a particular way is all the more blatant where Congress has attempted to deny judicial use of common Article 3 as a rule for decision in detainee cases after the Supreme Court clearly decided that common Article 3 is a primary rule for de- Section 7 of the MCA attempted a broader denial of rights of certain aliens to bring "any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement ... .,, 8 As noted elsewhere, Section 7 was a flagrant "denial of justice" under customary international law and of peremptory the treaty" of 1824 which had conferred part of the title to property in others); Chase v. United States, 222 F. 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1915 , on circuit) (state law attempting to allow seizure of "free negroes and persons of color" on ships that come into its harbors directly conflicts with the "paramount and exclusive" federal commerce power, "the treatymaking power," and "laws and treaties of the United States" by "converting a right into a crime," and a plea of necessity to protect state security does not obviate the primacy of the laws and treaties of the U.S. Further, a restriction of a treaty right by legislation, "even by the general government," cannot prevail). rights of access to courts, rights to a remedy, and equality of treatment under several multilateral and bilateral treaties of the U.S. and customary international law. 82 Additionally,
[s]uch a sweeping denial of treaty-based requirements is also a violation of the separation of powers, as it attempts to control judicial decision and to deny the judiciary its time-honored and essential role of applying fundamental and peremptory rights and requirements contained in treaty law of the United States.
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Another reason why Section 7 cannot be operative against treatybased rights is that a venerable Supreme Court rule of construction requires the primacy of any relevant treaty unless Congress has expressed within a subsequent federal statute a clear and unequivocal intent to override a particular treaty. 84 There is no such clear and unequivocal expression of congressional intent in Section 7 with respect to any treaty, and the only relevant expression in the MCA is in Section 5 with respect to the Geneva Conventions. Additionally, if even operative, Section 7 would be trumped by both the "rights under" treaties and law of war exceptions to the last in time rule. 85 Rights of hostile foreign nationals under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1907 Hague Convention operative during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are clearly among the relevant rights that cannot be declared abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law. Members of the Obama Administration and the judiciary should be careful that they do not declare that such rights are abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law under Sections 5 or 7 of the MCA, or in any other way. Additionally, the Obama Administration should not facilitate such a denial of rights if they wish to avoid possible accomplice liability. 90 More generally, the Founders, Framers, and early judiciary affirmed the fundamental expectation that Congress is bound by the law of nations. 91 They also recognized that judicial power exists to identify, clarify, and apply international law. 92 As Chief Justice Marshall recognized concerning the textual commitment to the judiciary of authority to decide cases arising under treaties and a test for self operative status and treaty-based remedies, " [t] INT'L L. 249, 258-62 (2004) . 93 Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809). Clearly, a right that "grows out of' or is "protected by" a treaty can be an implied right, an express right, and a right that is evident even though the treaty contains no mention of various forms of remedy that might attach. This type of test was reiterated by Justice Miller in 1884. See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (Miller, J., opinion) ("whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined." (emphasis added)). A number of Supreme Court cases have also recognized that treaties are to be construed in a broad manner to protect express and implied rights. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928) ; Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924) ("Treaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred."); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924) ("Construing the treaty liberally in favor of the rights claimed under it, as we are bound to do .... "); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) ("where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred."); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879) ("Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be preferred." (citing Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830) ("If the treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is limited, and the other liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude private rights; why should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?")). 94 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810) . Concerning the rich history of Founder, Framer, and judicial attention to human rights (which are generally at stake in these cases) and their use in thousands of federal and state cases, see, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 193-223. [Vol. 42:359 and several U.S. cases have recognized personal liability for violations of human rights law and the laws of war.
Additionally, as explained in Part III, there are various reasons why no federal statute should be interpreted contrary to international law to obviate civil liability of former President Bush, former Vice President Cheney, Alberto Gonzales, and others for perpetration of and complicity with respect to international crimes and the personal responsibility known as dereliction of duty with respect to dejure and defacto leaders. Moreover, under the last in time rule some seemingly limiting statutes regarding substitution of the U.S. for individual defendants are prior in time to relevant treaties and, however interpreted otherwise, must not prevail. Another federal statute, the MCA, is subsequent in time to U.S. ratification of relevant treaties, but there are several reasons why the MCA should not obviate jurisdiction in U.S. courts. Even if the MCA might otherwise be operative, the "rights under" treaties exception and the law of war exception to the last in time rule should ensure the primacy of rights to an effective remedy and access to courts under relevant international law. [Vol. 42:359 
